This paper adds imitation by incumbent rms, and not just by new entrants, to the model of selection and growth developed in Luttmer [2007]. Noisy rm-level innovation and imitation give rise to a long-run growth rate that exceeds the average rate at which individual rms innovate. It can be shown, in simple examples, that the economy converges to a long-run balanced growth path from compactly supported initial productivity distributions. The right tail of the stationary distribution of de-trended productivity is approximately Pareto. The tail index of this distribution depends on the rate at which incumbents are able to imitate only indirectly, through general equilibrium e ects of this parameter on the equilibrium growth rate. JEL classi cation: L110, O330
Introduction
Imitation can speed up growth if there is something to imitate, and if it does not do too much harm to the incentives of rms to innovate. But imitation makes a heterogeneous population more homogeneous, and this tends to make the e ects of imitation peter out. Luttmer [2007] presents a model of growth driven by imitation and selection in which entering rms can imitate incumbent rms, and in which low-productivity incumbents are forced to exit because of xed costs. Heterogeneity is preserved because individual rm productivities follow geometric Brownian motions. This paper adds imitation by incumbent rms, not just by entering rms, and shows that the noise generated by Brownian shocks to productivity continues to be enough to break the tendency of imitation to eliminate heterogeneity. In fact, the economy has a stationary distribution of rm productivity relative to aggregate productivity with the same Pareto tail that was obtained in Luttmer [2007] . Aggregate productivity grows at an endogenous rate, and the only way the right tail of the rm productivity distribution depends on incumbent imitation is through general equilibrium e ects on the equilibrium growth rate of aggregate productivity.
In the model, entrants and incumbents acquire imitation opportunities at Poisson rates. For entrants this takes costly entrepreneurial e ort, and for incumbents this happens at a rate that is taken to be exogenous. But entrants and incumbents have exactly the same ability to take advantage of imitation opportunities. When an opportunity to imitate arrives, both can sample a random incumbent rm and copy its productivity at no further cost. Since entrants sample incumbents that have not chosen to exit, adoption is always pro table for entrants. Incumbents only adopt the sampled technology if it implies an improvement in productivity.
The Poisson arrival of imitation opportunities delays the equalizing e ect of imitation. But if incumbent productivities are growing at a common deterministic rate in the absence of imitation opportunities, and if the initial distribution of productivity has compact support, then this initial heterogeneity will quickly disappear, as low-productivity rms catch up with the most productive incumbent rms. Alvarez, Buera and Lucas [2007] and Lucas and Moll [2011] avoid this implication by focusing on balanced growth paths that can only arise from initial productivity distributions with such thick right tails that imitation opportunities are never exhausted. This is an assumption about initial conditions that many will nd hard to defend. Taken literally, it means that all the growth that has happened since ancient times has been about more and more producers imitating ideas that were present in the population all along. The contribution of this 1 paper is to show that a little bit of independent randomness in the rates at which individual rms innovate is enough to preserve heterogeneity in the presence of imitation, and produce long-run growth, even if the range of productivities at some initial date is extremely limited.
The economy can be simpli ed by abstracting from xed costs and assuming a xed population of agents with heterogeneous productivities who simply produce for their own consumption instead of for the market. In this simpli ed economy, the distribution of productivities happens to satisfy a partial di erential equation -an example of a reaction-di usion equation-that was introduced by Fisher [1937] and Kolmogorov, Petrovskii and Piskunov [1937] to study the geographic spread of an advantageous gene. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [1981] have used this equation to describe the geographic spread of culture in human populations. As discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.1 below, the interpretation of random improvements and imitation given here is very di erent from the classic interpretation of this equation. Adapted to an economy with noise and imitation, the key result of Kolmogorov, Petrovskii and Piskunov [1937] shows that an initial distribution of productivity concentrated at a mass point transitions over the long run into a distribution of de-trended productivity that is stationary, with a trend that grows at a speci c rate. Later investigations have shown that this long-run trend is approached from below. In a rough sense, this implies a model of historical development in which the economy transitions over time from an economy with limited variation in productivity to one that grows at a steady rate, with a thick-tailed distribution of productivity.
Such a convergence result remains an open problem in the market economy that arises when rms participate in product and labor markets, and make optimal entry and exit decisions. But the balanced growth path for this economy can be described by a very simple system of ordinary di erential equations that can be solved numerically. Furthermore, this system of di erential equations shows precisely why the right-tail of the de-trended productivity distribution is approximately Pareto, and why incumbent imitation has no direct e ect on how thick this right tail will be.
Some Related Work This paper aims to add to a literature on models of growth and heterogeneity that feature search and imitation. In Jovanovic and Rob [1989] , the engine of growth is imitation in random meetings. Fogli and Veldkamp [2011] study the spread of ideas when meetings are not random but based on a network structure. Jovanovic and Eeckhout [2002] consider the e ect of imitation on rm size distributions using a more reduced-form copying mechanism. Kortum [1997] has a distribution of productivities that shifts to the right over time as agents search. This paper extends Luttmer [2007] by adding incumbent imitation to an economy with only entrant imitation. This follows and builds on the work of Alvarez 1 Alvarez, Buera and Lucas [2007] and Lucas and Moll [2011] abstract from entry and exit and focus on incumbent imitation. They show that imitation alone gives rise to balanced growth when the initial distribution of productivities has a su ciently thick right tail, but not otherwise. Lucas and Moll [2011] assume producers have a producerspeci c xed factor that must be divided between the production of consumption goods and the creation of imitation opportunities. They are able to characterize the e cient allocation and show the extent to which search and imitation externalities compromise welfare.
Perla and Tonetti [2012] consider a xed population of incumbent rms imitating incumbent rms, incorporating a trade-o between production and imitation. In their economy, only actively producing rms can be sampled by searching rms, and only relatively productive rms choose to produce rather than imitate. As a result, imitating rms always sample from a population of rms that are more productive than themselves. Balanced growth would not arise from an initial distribution with bounded support, but does with a thick-tailed initial distribution of productivity.
König, Lorenz and Zilibotti [2012] also consider imitation of incumbent rms by incumbent rms, using a mechanism similar to that in Lucas and Moll [2011] and Perla and Tonetti [2012] . Individual rms decide not between current production and imitation, but between rm-speci c innovation and imitation. This is an important and crucial di erence because the resulting innovation generates stochastic improvements in the individual productivities of rms that preserve heterogeneity, in spite of the tendency of imitation to make rms similar. As a result, König, Lorenz and Zilibotti [2012] obtain convergence from limited initial heterogeneity to long-term growth with a stable non-degenerate distribution of de-trended productivity. In their economy, innovation moves a rm up a quality ladder at a Poisson rate. This is probably easier to interpret than Brownian shocks to productivity, but it does not allow for the direct application of Kolmogorov, Petrovskii and Piskunov [1937] that is available in simple versions of the economy described here. More importantly, complementing entrant imitation with incumbent imitation in the growth model of Luttmer [2007] results in a highly tractable benchmark model that can accommodate rms operating subject to decreasing returns or as monopolistic competitors. And rms are making forward-looking decisions that generate realistic predictions about rm entry and exit.
The Rest of the Paper Section 2 makes the strong equalizing e ect of imitation explicit in a very simple example in which incumbent innovation is deterministic. It then adds Brownian noise, while maintaining the assumption of a xed population of producers. Section 3 characterizes the stationary distributions that arise from Brownian innovation in an economy with imitating entrants and incumbents, and with exit at an exogenously speci ed exit barrier. Section 4 then lays out the complete economy with optimal entry and exit decisions and characterizes the balanced growth path. Section 5 concludes.
Innovation and Imitation in a Fixed Population
Consider an economy with a large population of agents who produce and consume. Everyone has one unit of labor and a certain level of productivity that can evolve over time. The imitation mechanism is that of Alvarez, Buera and Lucas 
Deterministic Innovation
Write for log productivity of a particular producer at time . Suppose productivity evolves deterministically as a result of innovation by the producer, and stochastically because of randomness in the imitation process. Speci cally, suppose
where I represents innovation by this producer, is a Poisson process with arrival rate that counts opportunities to imitate. When an imitation opportunity arrives, the producer randomly selects another producer from the population. The producer with the imitation opportunity can copy the technology of the randomly selected producer, and will do so if this generates an increase in productivity. The resulting increase in productivity is represented by 0.
Write ( ) for the cumulative distribution of log productivity at time . The initial distribution (0 ) is given and then the process of innovation and imitation determines how ( ) evolves over time.
Degenerate Initial Conditions
In the simplest scenario, suppose all producers have the same initial productivity 0 , so that (0 ) is a non-decreasing step function with a unit step at 0 . Since all producers improve their own productivity at the same rate I , the population remains homogeneous, and producers cannot improve their productivity by imitating others. As a result, the degenerate distribution simply shifts tot the right, so that ( ) = (0 I ).
Stationary Distributions
Suppose instead that the initial productivity distribution (0 ) is smooth, and conjecture that ( ) will be as well for all . Then ( ) must satisfy the partial di erential equation
The negative term I D ( ) re ects the deterministic ow of individual producers to the right. There is also a ow ( ) of producers with log productivities in ( ] that sample from the population of producers. These producers move out of the range ( ] if they sample another producer with a productivity in excess of . This happens with probability 1 ( ). Note that ( ) can only decrease with . There is no entry into the range of log productivities ( ] from producers not already in that range.
Conjecture that there is a cumulative distribution function so that
for some E positive. Thus ( ) = (0 ) is the initial distribution of log productivity. Inserting this into (2) and evaluating the result at = E shows that must satisfy
for all . The right-hand side is non-negative and can only be zero when ( ) {0 1}. It follows that ( ) = ( E ) can only be a distribution function that solves (2) if E I . To simplify the calculations, write
The di erential equation for then becomes
which is solved by the logistic function
Since 0, this is increasing by construction. Note that the right tail 1 ( ) behaves like for large. Thus the level of productivity behaves like a Pareto distribution with right tail index . 3 Using (4) and (5) the smooth stationary distributions that solve (2) can be written as
This solution is indexed by two parameters: the initial value (0 0) and the trend parameter E I . The solution is non-degenerate if and only if (0 0) (0 1). Note well that the initial distribution (0 ) depends on the parameter E I . Thus the assumed shape of the initial distribution determines the rate at which productivity grows over time.
Starting from the right initial conditions, the long-run growth rate of this economy is above the rate at which individual producers improve productivity. In Luttmer [2007] , this happens because of entry, exit, and imitation by entrants. Here entry and exit plays no role and imitation by incumbents su ces to obtain accelerated growth. In Lucas and Moll [2011] , I = 0, but is not independent of because high-productivity producers choose to imitate less than low-productivity producers.
Smooth Initial Conditions
It turns out that in this environment, accelerated long-run growth is special, in that it can only arise from fortuitous initial conditions. To make this explicit requires solving (2) for more general initial conditions. The partial di erential equation (2) can be reduced to a system of ordinary di erential equations by de-trending the productivity state variable. De ne ( ) = ( + I )
This is now a system of ordinary di erential equations, instead of a partial di erential equation. The solution is ( ) = 1 (1 + [ 1+1 (0 )] ). The original distribution is ( ) = ( I ), and (0 ) = (0 ) in particular. Hence
for any smooth initial conditions (0 ). To check this against the stationary distributions obtained earlier, note that (17) and (6) imply
(
But (8) is not a logistic distribution if (0 ) is not logistic. It is clear from the description of the economy that initial conditions with a compact support lead to ( ) that have a compact support as well-nobody can overtake the most productive producer or fall behind the least productive producer. To make explicit what happens to ( ) over time, suppose and are nite and assume (0 ) = 0 and (0 ) = 1. If (0 ) varies smoothly in between, then (8) implies
1´
This means that ( + I ) = 0 for and ( + I ) = 1 for . No producer at time will be less productive than + I , or more productive than + I . In between, 0 implies lim (
That is, the productivity distribution will converge to a distribution concentrated at + I , and not to any logistic limiting distribution. Because the initial distribution has compact support and everyone innovates at the same rate, one cannot hope to obtain a stationary distribution by taking out a trend that di ers from I . The long-run growth rate is determined by the rate at which individual producers innovate. But imitation does matter. The easier it is to imitate, in the sense that imitation opportunities arise more frequently, the more quickly will any initial productive heterogeneity disappear. For an example, consider an initial distribution with support [0 1] given by (0 ) = {1 + cos( ( 1) As expected, the ( ) converge to a point mass that shifts to the right at rate I . All initial heterogeneity disappears over time, as low-productivity producers receive more and more draws that allow them to approach the productivity frontier. In this economy, imitation changes the level of aggregate output, as more and more producers use technologies close to the frontier. But the long-run growth rate of the economy is una ected by imitation and completely determined by the rate at which individual producers innovate.
Brownian Innovation
Imitation tends to eliminate heterogeneity, even if there is randomness in who gets to imitate whom. An obvious way to preserve heterogeneity is to introduce randomness in the innovation processes of individual producers. Consider the same economy as before, but now add Brownian terms to the individual innovation processes. Thus innovation makes individual productivity go up and down stochastically. One can imagine that all change is irreversible and producers do not know in advance whether a change is for the better. Or the market conditions encountered by a particular producer could change. Imitation is still an unambiguous source of productivity improvement: producers only adopt a technology when it is more productive than their own, and the implicit assumption is that it can be copied perfectly.
Therefore, instead of (1), suppose that the log productivity of a particular producer evolves according to
where is a standard Brownian motion, a Poisson process with arrival rate , and an increment in log productivity that is obtained by copying another randomly selected producer-provided this leads to a productivity improvement. Every producer is subject to di erent Brownian noise, and this will be a force for increasing productivity dispersion. In a large population, any initial discreteness in the initial productivity distribution is smoothed out instantaneously.
As before, let ( ) be the distribution of log productivity at time . Then
for all 0 and ( ). Without the last term on the right-hand side, this is the Kolmogorov forward equation, written in terms of distribution functions on the unbounded domain ( ). The last term on the right-hand side of (10) arises from imitation, exactly as in the deterministic case (2) . As before, take out the common trend I by considering ( ) = ( + I ). Then (10) becomes
which generalizes (7). Without imitation, when = 0, (10) is solved by the distribution function of a normal random variable with mean 0 + I and variance 2 , which reduces to a point mass at 0 when = 0. One can then integrate over the initial distribution (0 0 ) to obtain a solution that satis es the desired initial condition. Since random walks, with or without trends, are non-stationary, the distributions ( ) that solve (10) will not converge when = 0. The properties of (10) are very di erent when is positive. Consider solutions to (10) of the form ( ) = ( E ). Evaluating (10) at = E gives
for all ( ). Since is supposed to be a distribution function, ( ) [0 1], ( ) = 0 and ( ) = 1. Note that E I would imply that is convex. But distribution functions on ( ) cannot be convex, and so (12) cannot be solved by a cumulative distribution function unless E I . If there is a stationary distribution, then the growth rate of aggregate productivity must be higher than the average rate at which individual productivities improve over time.
The partial di erential equation (11) and the associated stationary distributions implied by (12) have been widely studied. Equation (12) can be solved for a distribution function on ( ) provided that E I + 2 . 4 Kolmogorov, Petrovskii and
Piskunov [1937] and McKean [1975 McKean [ , 1976 prove that starting from a point mass (0 ), the distributions ( + E ) converge to a non-degenerate limiting distribution when E is taken to be at its lower bound
The same is also true for initial distributions with compact support. 5 Furthermore,
McKean [1975] shows that the median of ( ) always lags behind the trend E . In this sense, the E de ned in (13) is a maximal attainable long-run growth rate to which an economy converges from below, given compactly supported initial conditions. This yields a precise prediction for the long-run growth rate E , and for the resulting stationary productivity distribution. Clearly, imitation is essential for accelerated growth. We have already seen that growth at a rate above I cannot arise from limited initial heterogeneity when there is no noise. The formula (13) shows that the amount of long-run acceleration that is possible with noisy innovation is linear in the standard deviation of that noise.
Some Traditional Interpretations of (11)
Fisher [1937] proposed (11) to describe the geographic spread of an advantageous gene, and Kolmogorov, Petrovskii and Piskunov [1937] adopted the same interpretation. More broadly, (11) is an example of a reaction-di usion equation. The second term on the right-hand side of (11) can be a more general function of ( ) in such equations. Reaction-di usion equations have a number of di erent interpretations in biology and the physical sciences. In the original interpretation of Fisher [1937] , is a location, ( ) is the population density at a point , and is positive (note that 1 ( ) satis es the same equation with replacing ). The quadratic term ( )[1 ( )] then measures logistic population growth at the location , with growth rates shrinking from near to near zero as the population in a particular location gets close to its "carrying capacity," normalized to 1. In this interpretation, Here, measures a productivity rather than a location, and ( ) is a distribution function rather than a density. The classic di usion terminology is potentially confusing in the present context. The di usion term (11) does not represent technology di usion, but continuous random and autonomous changes in the productivities of individual producers. Instead, technology di usion takes place in jumps, when producers imitate randomly selected producers with productivities greater than their own. This is accounted for by the term (11) and not by the di usion term equal to a point mass at 0, the ( ) that solves (11) is the cumulative distribution function of the rst order statistic of a branching Brownian motion. In the present context, suppose initially there is one producer with log productivity zero. Log productivity then follows a standard Brownian motion. At a unit Poisson rate, this producer generates a spino . 6 The initial log productivity of this spino producer is that of its parent.
Immediately after the spino , the log productivities of parent and spino proceed as independent standard Brownian motions. Both parent and spino will produce further spino s at independent Poisson rates, and so on. This generates a stochastically growing population of producers, with a growth rate that settles down over time to the unit Poisson rate at which producers generate spino s. In this growing but nite population, ( ) is the distribution at time of the productivity of the most productive producer. Note well that this is not the cross-sectional distribution of productivities at time that is of interest here.
Entry and Selective Exit
Consider again the economy with Brownian innovation. A simple way to introduce population growth into this economy is to assume that, at a Poisson rate , every producer generates a new entrant who inherits its productivity, as in the above discussion of McKean [1975] . Equivalently, one can assume there is a ow of entrants equal to times the measure of incumbent producers, who enter with productivities sampled at random from the incumbent population. All this does is cause the population to grow at the rate . In this growing population, (10) and all its implications still hold. In particular, productivity will tend to grow at the rate (13) in the long run. One can also assume that some producers exit randomly. Conclusions about the long-run distribution of productivity are not a ected.
A slightly di erent scenario arises when there is a ow = of new entrants, where and are positive parameters speci ed independently of the size of the initial population of producers. As before, entrants sample an entry productivity from the incumbent population. Both the entry rate and the population growth rate will converge to in the long run, but these rates will not equal from the start unless the initial population size happens to be . Nevertheless, one expects the convergence result of Kolmogorov, Petrovskii and Piskunov [1937] and McKean [1975] to apply.
Again take the ow of entrants to be = so that the population has to grow at the rate in the long run. Suppose further that producers exit when their productivity crosses + E from above. The constant simply depends on what is associated with calendar time, and exit at + E will force the distribution as well as its density to be zero at this exit barrier, just as they would be at in an economy without exit (see Cox and Miller [1965] ). But with , the slope of the stationary density at the exit barrier scales with the exit rate, and this now becomes an equilibrium variable. As shown in Luttmer [2007] , even given a particular value for E , there can be multiple stationary stationary distributions, indexed not by the growth rate E , but by the exit rate at the barrier + E . The question then again arises: to which of these stationary distributions will productivity distributions converge given compactly supported initial conditions?
Population Dynamics
Let ( ) denote the measure of incumbent producers at time with log productivity + E or higher. Thus ( ) integrates a density from the right, and it describes the distribution of log productivity relative to the trend E of the exit barrier. The drift of incumbent relative to exit productivities is thus = I E . If E I then the exit barrier catches up with incumbent productivity on average, and will be negative. The ow of entering producers samples from the distribution 1 ( ) ( ) and entrants can start with the productivity they have sampled. As before, incumbent producers receive imitation opportunities at the Poisson rate .
Starting from (0 ), the measure of incumbent producers at time evolves according to
The left-hand side and the rst two terms on the right-hand side are the result of integrating the Kolmogorov forward equation for the density. The last term on the right-hand side measures the ow of incumbent producers who reach [ ) as new entrants or as incumbent producers with an imitation opportunity. The ow of entrants is , and a ow [ ( ) ( )] of incumbents receive imitation opportunities that could move them into [ ). But because they can only imitate a randomly selected incumbent producer, they succeed with probability ( ) ( ). The exit barrier = gives rise to the boundary conditions
There are no producers below = and exit at this barrier means that the density at = is also zero. Given an initial condition (0 ), the equations (14) and (15) determine how the measure of surviving producers ( ) evolves over time. Evaluating (14) at the exit barrier = and using the boundary conditions (15) gives
The density at the exit barrier is D ( ) = 0, and so the slope D ( ) of this density must be positive. The population of survivors changes according to D ( ), and (16) means that 
Stationary Distributions
If the exit rate is constant, then the ow of entrants = , with and positive, implies a population growth rate that converges to in the long run. Conjecture that there is a balanced growth path of the form
for some population level and some right cumulative distribution function ( ), both to be determined. Then (14) and (15) can be written as
for all together with the boundary conditions ( ) = 1 and D ( ) = 0. A distribution function 1 ( ) that solves this second-order di erential equation for some population level de nes a balanced growth path. Evaluating the di erential equation at = gives the stationary analog to (16),
This emphasizes the fact that the entry rate is jointly determined with the distribution ( ). The slope of the density at = implies an exit rate . Note that ( ) shows up in linear terms on both sides of the above di erential equation, and the coe cient that appears on the right-hand side is determined jointly with ( ). It will be convenient to de ne
This is the sum of the rate at which incumbent producers imitate, and the exit rate . Since the exit rate must be non-negative, this implies that . The di erential equation for ( ) can now be written as
for all , together with the boundary conditions
Any combination of a distribution function 1 ( ) and an entry parameter that satis es (18) (18) - (19) in the special case = 0 and nds that compactly supported initial distributions converge to the stationary distribution associated with E = I + 2 . The formula E = I + 2 therefore describes the limiting growth rate in the two special cases = and = 0, suggesting that the same may be true for (0 ).
Constructing Stationary Distributions
The following adapts some of the initial steps in Kolmogorov, Petrovskii and Piskunov [1937] and McKean [1975] to account for exit. Fix some exit boundary and exit parameter . Write ( ) = D ( ) for the density at . The di erential equation (18)- (19) is equivalent to the rst-order system
with the initial conditions ( ) = 1 and ( ) = 0. This di erential equation is autonomous and so the solution only depends on . Note that the di erential equation becomes linear when = 0. This is the case solved in Luttmer [2007] .
Starting from any initial conditions, the pair of di erential equations ( 
The imitation parameter multiplies a quadratic term in (21) and so it drops out from the linearization. The eigenvalues of the matrix on the right-hand side of (22) are
Since 0, both eigenvalues are negative if real. Complex eigenvalues result in trajectories that spiral around the stationary point [0 0]. Along such trajectories, ( ) and ( ) become negative, and so parameters that gives rise to complex eigenvalues are not associated with stationary distributions. Since we also have , this means that must satisfy 1 2
The rst inequality arises because exit rates are positive, and the second is necessary for the existence of a stationary distribution. Observe the upper bound for together with 0 implies that 2 = E I , and thus E I + 2 . This is the bound we already have in (13) for the special case = , and in Luttmer [2007] for the special case = 0. 
Figure 2 Phase Diagram for [D ( ) D ( )]
Remarkably, the tail index (24) does not depend on the imitation Poisson rate , in contrast to both the case of deterministic innovation studied in Alvarez, Buera and Lucas [2007] and Lucas and Moll [2011] , and the case of Brownian innovation without exit presented above. Because the linearized di erential equation (22) , the tail index (24) of the stationary distribution does not depend on either. Given 0 and , the precise rate at which incumbents imitate has no e ect on the shape of the right tail of the productivity distribution. The condition says that there is exit. The economy with no exit and productivities distributed throughout ( ) has = , and with this (24) does again depend on .
Balanced Growth
The economy with a xed population in Section 2 can be interpreted as an economy with agents who produce for their own consumption. The growing exit barrier + E in Section 3 requires a more intricate interpretation. The following takes producers to be rms and embeds the imitation mechanism of Section 3 in an economy very similar to Luttmer [2007] . This yields equilibrium conditions that explain why rms exit and why aggregate productivity grows at the rate E , along a balanced growth path.
Consumers
Consider an economy with a growing population = of consumers whose dynastic preferences over per-capita consumption ows are determined by Z 0 ln( )d
for some positive subjective discount rate . Given complete markets, these preferences imply an interest rate equal to
At any point in time, consumers can choose to supply labor or choose to be an entrepreneur. Being an entrepreneur means looking for opportunities to create a new rm. If the opportunity to create a new rm arrives, the entrepreneur can randomly select an incumbent rm and adopt its technology, at no further cost. Abilities vary, and there is a atomless distribution of labor and entrepreneurial skills in the population. Labor skills determine the ow of labor services a consumer can supply, and entrepreneurial skills determine the Poisson rate at which a consumer can start new rms. Comparative advantage determines the services consumers choose to supply. Write for the expected market value at time of a randomly sampled rm, measured in units labor. Consumers for whom the product of and the Poisson rate at which they are able to create new rms exceeds 1 will choose to be entrepreneurs, and all other consumers will choose to be workers. Given a talent distribution, one can compute the supplies of labor and entrepreneurial services,
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The assumption that the talent distribution is smooth ensures that (·) and (·) are smooth. Assuming the talent distribution has a mean, both will be bounded. The function (·) is decreasing and (·) is increasing. An increase in the expected value of trying to start up a rm induces more agents to switch from supplying labor to being an entrepreneur. Along a balanced growth path, will be constant at some equilibrium level , and hence and will grow at the same rate as the population.
Firms
Firms are production functions that use labor, subject to decreasing returns to scale. Following entry, a xed cost must be paid continuously to continue the rm.
Static Decisions
A typerm is a Cobb-Douglas technology that can be used to produce a ow of
[ ] units of consumption using units of labor, where (0 1) is the factor share of labor. At any point in time , there are many incumbent rms with rm-speci c xed factor levels . These change according to
As before, is a standard Brownian motion, is a Poisson process with arrival rate , and is an increment obtained by allowing the rm to adopt the technology of another rm, sampled at random from the population of incumbent rms. Firms must continuously expend a ow of 0 units of labor to survive, inducing exit of rms that are not su ciently productive. Wages at time are denoted by , in units of consumption per unit of time. A typerm facing wages at time chooses labor inputs by solving
This implies labor inputs equal to
After xed costs, the resulting pro ts are
where the state variable is given by
Thus is normalized so that pro ts are zero when is zero and 1 measures pro ts in units of labor. Labor inputs expressed in terms of are = (1 ). Up to an intercept, measures log variable employment, a measure of rm size.
Let be the growth rate of wages along a balanced growth path. Then (26) and (27) imply that d = d + d + d , where
The drift I is a parameter, and E and are equilibrium variables associated with a balanced growth path. From Section 3 we know that (26)- (28) gives rise to stationary distributions if combined with exit at a lower threshold for and entry at randomly sampled points above . As before, let (·) denote the right tail of such a distribution and write = for the number of rms along a balanced growth path. Stationary distributions must satisfy the di erential equation (18)- (19) for some = + ( ) , as in (17) . Following the convergence considerations discussed in Section 3, select the particular stationary distribution implied by
With this, there is a unique stationary distribution (·), given the exit threshold and the drift = I E .
Exit and Entry Decisions
The construction so far gives rise to pro ts and labor income that grow at a per-capita rate along a balanced growth path. It follows that per-capita consumption will also grow at the rate , and hence the interest rate must be + . Since pro ts in units of consumption are ( 1) and grows at the rate , it follows that the value of a rm in state is ( ), where 
where the optimal barrier must satisfy
The last term on the right-hand side of (30) describes the capital gains that arise from the arrival, at the rate , of opportunities to imitate by randomly selecting another rm and copy its technology if it is more productive than . The condition ( ) = 0 arises from the fact that exit leaves the rm with nothing, and D ( ) = 0 is a familiar smooth-pasting condition that is required for to be optimal. Given and (·), the Bellman equation (30)- (31) determines the value function and the optimal threshold below which this value function will be equal to zero. Note well that the distribution (·) depends itself on a hypothesized exit barrier. In equilibrium, this exit barrier must be the same as the exit barrier that follows from (30)-(31). Given , this results in a xed point condition for . Potential entrants draw a state from the distribution ( ). The result will be a new rm with value ( ) in units of labor. The expected value of entry is thus
in units of labor. The supply of entrepreneurial services (25) combined with the de nition = + ( ) imply that the per-capita number of rms can be written as
The amount of variable labor used by a rm in state is (1 ), and the xed labor requirement is . Aggregating over all rms gives the labor market clearing condition
One can think of (33) as the steady-state supply of rms, and (34) as the demand for rms derived from the supply of labor ( ) . The market clearing price is , but also has to satisfy the forward-looking condition (32). This implies an equilibrium condition that drives the determination of the drift parameter , via the dependence of (·) and (·) on this equilibrium parameter.
A balanced growth path is now de ned by an exit barrier , a drift parameter with an associated entry parameter determined by (29), the implied stationary distribution 1 ( ) determined by (18)- (19), a value function ( ) that satis es (30)-(31), and a value of entry de ned as (32) that also satis es the market clearing conditions (33)-(34). The level of consumption and wages at the initial date is determined by matching the stationary distribution 1 ( ) with the time-0 distribution of xed factors, using (27).
Constructing Balanced Growth Paths
Holding xed = I E , the conditions for a balanced growth path can be reduced to a system of rst-order di erential equations. After solving these equations, one can back out the xed cost parameter that is consistent with equilibrium.
The Bellman equation (30) depends on the expected gains from imitation. Given an imitation opportunity, these gains are given by
for a rm with a current state . The expected capital gains ( ) appear on the right-hand side of the Bellman equation (30), and the value of entry (32) is given by = ( ). Note that D ( ) = D ( ) ( ). Since ( ) is an increasing function, the integral that de nes ( ) converges if and only if ( ) 0 for large . This is a boundary condition for D ( ) = D ( ) ( ) that can be used to solve for ( ) given ( ) and ( ). The construction is now as follows. Fix some 0 and let = ( ) 2 2, as in (29).
The stationary distribution is determined by
This determines (·) and (·) up to a shift . The value function (·) and the associated gains from imitation (·) must satisfy
(36)
This is a system of three rst-order di erential equations for (·), (·) and (·). For xed , the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions (31) provide two boundary conditions, and the requirement that ( ) 0 as provides a third. But remains to be determined. What is missing is the transversality condition for the in nite-horizon problem of a rm. Rather than impose this transversality condition directly, one can exploit the fact that for very large, ( ) must behave like the value of a rm with no imitation opportunities (because ( ) 0 as becomes large) and no option to exit (because this option is very unlikely to be exercised as becomes large). The value of such a hypothetical rm is simply the expected present value of 
The right-hand side can be interpreted as the average demand for labor, measured in units of the xed amount of labor needed to operate a rm, implied by a unit ow of entrants. The left-hand side is the supply of labor in the same units divided by the equilibrium ow of entrants-observe that this is a decreasing function of the amount of labor it takes to continue a rm. Imposing (38) gives an equilibrium condition for = I E 0. More easily, one can conjecture a 0 and then use this condition to solve for the implicit xed cost that makes an equilibrium.
A Numerical Example
Suppose E is the equilibrium growth rate for an economy with = 0, no incumbent imitation. From Luttmer [2007] , this implies 0. Note that (29) implies = ( ) 2 2 0. Fix E , take some (0 ), and again solve for the value function ( ), the gains from imitation ( ), and the distribution 1 ( ). Taking the value functions of other rms as given, the ability to imitate increases the value of a particular rm. Furthermore, although the exit threshold will be lower for 0 than for = 0, rm productivities grow faster because of imitation, and this shifts much of the productivity distribution to the right. Both e ects make for higher rm values. In particular, the value of entry = ( ) will be higher when 0. This encourages more consumers to become entrepreneurs and reduces labor supply. At the same time, the average rm will be larger, and so the demand for labor will be higher. In addition, rms move away from the exit barrier more quickly, and this implies a lower exit rate . A lower exit rate translates into a higher steady state number of rms, further increasing the demand for labor. There will be an excess demand for labor, implying that the original growth rate E associated with = 0 is no longer an equilibrium.
It is easy to see that the new balanced growth rate E must be higher. This lowers the rate = I E at which incumbent productivity grows by itself, relative to entry productivity. This makes incumbent rms smaller-in particular, the tail index 2 increases, implying a thinner right tail. The value of incumbent rms will be lower, because of the weaker growth prospects of individual rms, and because the population that can be imitated is less productive. Such a decline in the value of incumbent rms is precisely what is needed to help clear the labor market. More consumers will choose to be workers rather than entrepreneurs, and rms are less productive and demand less labor. Both e ects work to reduced the excess demand for labor implied by the growth rate of an economy without imitation.
Quantitatively, everything will hinge on the supply functions (·) and (·) of entrepreneurial services and labor services. If these supplies are relative elastic, then it will take only a small change in the value of entry to clear the labor market, and hence only a small change in the equilibrium growth rate of the economy. If these supplies are completely inelastic, then there is an excess demand for labor at the original growth rate simply because the average rm is larger with imitation than without imitation, and not because anyone switches from supplying labor services to supplying entrepreneurial services. In that case, all the adjustment in the labor market clearing condition (38) has to come from an increase in the equilibrium exit rate = 1 2 ¡ ¢ 2 and an increase 24 in the tail index 2 that will result from a higher value of = E I . To illustrate this in a numerical example, it is easiest computationally to start with an equilibrium with incumbent imitation and then determine the equilibrium for an alternative economy with = 0. Figure 3 shows the value functions ( ) and the gains from imitation ( ) associated with = 0 05, = 0 02 and = 0 10, for an economy with 0 and an economy with = 0. Note that these parameters imply a tail index of 2 = 2. 7 In the economy with imitation, the imitation parameter is set equal to = 2, where = ( ) 2 2. This implies = 0 01. Both sets of functions are determined by solving (35)-(36). As expected, the value function for 0 dominates the one for = 0, and both converge to the present value of 1 when is large. Now suppose the used in Figure 3 is the equilibrium value of = I E for an economy with imitation. Suppose the supplies of entrepreneurial and labor services are inelastic. With some abuse of notation, write the left-hand side of the equilibrium condition (38) as ( ). Suppose the population growth rate is = 0 01 and the factor share of variable 7 In the data, this number is slightly above 1. The closer 2 is to 1, the more important the far right tail of the productivity distribution is for calculating aggregates and present values. This makes numerical procedures more fragile and requires more rigorous testing of these procedures than performed for this draft. Results for 2 close to 1 will be reported in a future draft.
labor equals = 0 7. Then one can calculate the right-hand side of (38) and thus infer ( ). This gives a number of close to 1,000. Since + = 0 02, this implies that ( + ) ( ) 20. That is, xed costs amount to roughly 5% of rm employment in the economy with incumbent imitation. Now hold xed ( ) and compute the equilibrium for = 0 by solving (38) for , using the density ( ) = 2 ( ) ( ) with = ( ) 2 2 and the exit threshold determined by the optimal stopping problem for and = 0, obtained in Luttmer [2007] . This gives = 0 0164, implying a tail index equal to 1 64. The change from the 0 equilibrium = 0 02 to the = 0 equilibrium = 0 0164 implies a reduction in the growth rate E = I of the economy equal to 0 36% per annum. As expected, incumbent imitation speeds up growth in this economy.
The resulting productivity distributions are shown in Figure 4 . The solid curve is the equilibrium distribution for 0. Holding xed and solving the di erential equation (35)-(36) again for = 0, analytically using Luttmer [2007] , gives a productivity distribution with the same tail index, but with a higher exit threshold . In equilibrium, the economy with = 0 and the same ( ) will then have a lower growth rate E and hence a = I E 0 that is closer to zero. The result is a productivity distribution with a thicker right tail, as shown in Figure 4 .
It goes without saying that the improvement in long-run growth rates generated by incumbent imitation ignores the fact that there may be negative e ects on the incentives of rms to innovate. Here, I is an exogenous parameter. Luttmer [2010] suggests a model of managerial e ort choice in which this parameter becomes endogenous.
Concluding Remarks
The results in this paper suggests that an economy starting out with a narrow range of initial productivities will, after some period of transition, settle down on a balanced growth path along which aggregate productivity grows faster than the average rate at which individual producers are able to innovate. Both noisy innovation and imitation are essential. Without noise, imitation will eventually make all producers look alike. Without imitation, aggregate growth is limited by the rate at which individual rms can innovate. An interesting quantitative question that arises is: how long does an economy with limited initial heterogeneity linger before it locks on to a path of stable growth?
Although incumbent rms can imitate, their imitation is not frictionless. It is delayed by their undirected search, and by the nite Poisson rate at which imitation opportunities arrive. This delay allows rm productivities to be widely dispersed. In turn this dispersion gives rise to a thick-tailed distribution of rm employment, as observed in the data. Luttmer [2011] gives an alternative interpretation of the employment size distribution of rms that invokes heterogeneous histories of capital accumulation instead of heterogeneous histories of productivity growth. In such an economy, rampant imitation can lead to very similar productivities, without necessarily implying a counterfactual lack of heterogeneity in rm size. Non-rival ideas may be easy to copy, but accumulating the rival capital needed to implement these ideas takes time.
